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AN UNREASONABLE BAN ON REASONABLE
COMPETITION: THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S
PROTECTIONIST STANCE AGAINST
NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS BINDING INHOUSE COUNSEL
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ABSTRACT
In the vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States, a business
may protect its confidential information and customer goodwill by
conditioning employment on an employee’s acceptance of a covenant
not to compete. These covenants are beneficial to the marketplace
because they allow employers to provide employees with necessary
skills, knowledge, and proprietary information without any fear of
misappropriation. Accordingly, noncompete agreements are upheld
by courts so long as they pass a fact-specific “reasonableness” test.
Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of reasonable
noncompete agreements for all other professionals—including
doctors and corporate executives—forty-eight states, following the
American Bar Association’s lead, prohibit all noncompete agreements
among lawyers. This prohibition is purportedly designed to protect
both an attorney’s professional autonomy and a client’s right to
choose his counsel. Despite legal commentators’ criticism of the
prohibition, several state bar associations have recently extended it
beyond the traditional law-firm context to agreements between
companies and their in-house counsel. This expansion has
transformed a questionable policy of professional self-regulation into
an unjustifiable infringement on the legitimate interests of corporate
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employers. In addition to providing an analysis of the history and
ethical norms that justify rejection of the ban’s application to in-house
counsel, this Note argues that bar committees that issue opinions
supporting the ban’s extension may be susceptible to antitrust liability
under the Supreme Court’s new Dental Board standard pertaining to
state-action immunity.

Our duty to regulate the legal profession is not for the purpose of
creating a monopoly for lawyers, or for their economic
protection . . . .
1

– Linder v. Insurance Claims Consultants
INTRODUCTION

Since early English common law, it has been widely accepted
that employers have a legitimate right to protect their confidential
information, trade secrets, and customer goodwill from
2
misappropriation. To protect this right, an employer may lawfully
condition employment on an employee’s acceptance of a “covenant
3
not to compete.” A “noncompete” agreement is valid and
enforceable as long as the covenant is no “greater than necessary to
protect the [employer’s] legitimate interests,” does not “impose[] an
undue hardship on the employee,” and is not “injurious to the public
4
interest.” Courts routinely apply this “reasonableness” test when
considering the enforceability of noncompete agreements governing
virtually every employee and professional in the United States,
including doctors, dentists, veterinarians, corporate executives, and,
5
until the 1960s, lawyers.

1. Linder v. Ins. Claims Consultants, Inc., 560 S.E.2d 612, 617 (S.C. 2002).
2. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) (“The
inhibition against restraints of trade at common law seems at first to have had no exception.”).
3. Throughout this Note, the commonly used terms “covenant not to compete,”
“noncompete agreements,” “noncompete covenants,” “noncompetes,” “noncompetition
agreements,” and “restrictive covenants” are used interchangeably without any substantive
change in implied meaning.
4. E.g., Merrimack Valley Wood Prods. v. Near, 876 A.2d 757, 762 (N.H. 2005).
5. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 181–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(applying the reasonableness test to noncompete agreements involving corporate executives);
Hicklin v. O’Brien, 138 N.E.2d 47, 52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956) (lawyers); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390
A.2d 1161, 1166 (N.J. 1978) (doctors); Kaeser v. Adamson, No. CA-773, 1982 WL 5602, at *8
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Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of reasonable
noncompete agreements for other professionals, many within the
legal community argue that noncompete agreements for attorneys
should be held to a significantly different standard. This assertion
dates back to a 1961 American Bar Association (ABA) Ethics
Opinion, which held for the first time that all restrictive
postemployment covenants for lawyers should be treated as per se
6
unethical. The Opinion justified this special prohibition by explaining
that “[t]he practice of law . . . is a profession, not a business,”
“[c]lients are not merchandise,” “lawyers are not tradesmen,” and
covenants are “an unwarranted restriction on the right of a lawyer to
choose where he will practice and inconsistent with our professional
7
status.” Over the last half century, the underlying justification has
evolved, but the per se prohibition on attorney noncompetes has
remained. Today, ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC,
Model Rule, or Rule) 5.6 reflects that prohibition:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other
similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to
practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement
8
concerning benefits upon retirement . . . .

The official Comments to the Model Rule explain that the
prohibition is designed to protect lawyers’ professional autonomy and
9
assure clients’ freedom to choose a lawyer. Although the Model
Rules are only guidelines, forty-eight states have adopted some

(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1982) (veterinarians); Olson v. Hillsdale Dental, Ltd., 371 N.W.2d 429,
429 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (unpublished disposition) (dentists).
6. Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal
Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 488 (2008).
7. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
9. Id. cmt. 1 (“An agreement restricting the right of lawyers to practice after leaving a
firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose
a lawyer.”). Recent ethics opinions emphasize that client autonomy is the primary rationale for
the rule. See, e.g., Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 87-24 (1988) (“The purpose . . .
is to ensure that clients may seek the legal advice of a lawyer of their choosing. Although law
firms have a right to protect their legitimate business interests, including their client base, they
may not do so to the exclusion of the client’s preference.”).
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version of Rule 5.6 or its substantially similar predecessor, ABA
10
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-108.
Violation of these professional-conduct rules and opinions may
be enforceable by professional sanctions, but they are not designed
11
for court enforcement. Nevertheless, courts regularly rely on these
pronouncements as persuasive authority and “in the case of lawyer
noncompete covenants, [they] have relied almost completely on the
12
ABA’s approach to the issue.”
The vast majority of opinions discussing and enforcing Rule 5.6’s
per se ban have only considered the Rule as it applies to lawyers who
13
leave a law firm in order to practice at another law firm. These
opinions have been met with a litany of justifiable academic
criticisms, which primarily assert that law firms invest substantial time
and resources into training and developing attorneys and should
therefore be allowed to protect these legitimate interests with
14
reasonable noncompete agreements. Critics also point out that it is
nonsensical to create a special exception for the legal profession
based on public-policy objectives of safeguarding “client choice,”
when we readily enforce reasonable noncompetes in the medical
15
profession (and every other profession). Despite staunch academic
16
criticism, these cries for reform have largely fallen on deaf ears. Only

10. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980); see Linda
Sorenson Ewald, Agreements Restricting the Practice of Law: A New Look at an Old Paradox,
26 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 6 & n.11 (2002) (listing which states have adopted the rule).
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(“Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should
it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached.”).
12. Barton, supra note 6, at 489. For an overview of the small minority of courts that has
rejected the ABA’s approach, see infra Part II.C.
13. Barbara C. Bentrup, Note, Friend or Foe: Reasonable Noncompete Restrictions Can
Benefit Corporate In-House Counsel and Protect Corporate Employers, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1037, 1037–38 (2008).
14. E.g., Wm. C. Turner Herbert, Comment, Let’s Be Reasonable: Rethinking the
Prohibition Against Noncompete Clauses in Employment Contracts Between Attorneys in North
Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 249, 266–67 (2003) (discussing law firms’ “interest in minimizing
competition”).
15. Id. at 278 (“Nor does any substantive distinction between the medical and legal
professions justify the latter's prohibition from the reasonable use of noncompetition
agreements.”); Barton, supra note 6, at 490 (“The distinction between lawyers and other
professionals is quite difficult to defend. . . . In fact, the choice of a doctor seems much more
personal and much more likely to have serious and life-changing ramifications than the choice
of a lawyer.”).
16. For an example of this criticism, see Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele Jr.,
Ethics and the Law of Contract Juxtaposed: A Jaundiced View of Professional Responsibility
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two states—California and Arizona—have abandoned the per se
17
prohibition.
Although the blanket prohibition on noncompete agreements in
the law-firm context is well established, there has been limited
attention to the prohibition as it relates to such agreements between
18
corporate in-house counsel and their employers. In fact, the most
formal pronouncement on the subject comes from a state ethics
opinion, rather than a court. In July 2006, the New Jersey Supreme
Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics addressed the
issue directly and announced that the flat prohibition on restrictive
covenants applicable to outside counsel is equally applicable to in19
house counsel.
In the ten years since the New Jersey Opinion was issued, the
demand for in-house counsel has continued to grow, and lateral
movement by in-house counsel has triggered a number of cases
involving the misappropriation of trade secrets by in-house attorneys
20
for the gain of direct competitors. Yet surprisingly little attention
Considerations in the Attorney–Client Relationship, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791, 846 (1991).
Anderson and Steele posit:
Whether the fulcrum for balancing interests of clients over those of their lawyers is a
narcissistic concept of ourselves as paragons of professional propriety—as superfiduciaries—or the absurdly conflicting notion that good lawyers are hard to find, we
wonder how much longer these outmoded, unrealistic concepts can be used to deny
attorneys fair access to the norms of the marketplace, restricted only by the same
rules applicable to doctors, to ministers, to accountants, and to all other fiduciarybased professions.
Id.
17. Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C., 138 P.3d 723, 729 (Ariz. 2006)
(en banc) (“[Restrictive covenants between lawyers], as is the case with restrictive covenants
between other professionals, should be examined under the reasonableness standard.”);
Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 157 (Cal. 1993) (“[W]e can see no legal justification for
treating partners in law firms differently in this respect from partners in other businesses and
professions.”). This concept is discussed infra Part II.C.
18. Bentrup, supra note 13, at 1037–38; see also N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Op. 858 (2011) (evaluating the legitimacy of a confidentiality agreement in an in-house
attorney’s employment contract, and noting that previous decisions regarding Rule 5.6 occurred
in a “quite different context[]” of law-firm partnership agreements, and therefore do not control
the interpretation of an in-house attorney’s covenant not to compete).
19. N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006). As discussed infra Part II.D,
several other state ethics committees have extended the per se ban to in-house counsel. The
New Jersey Opinion is largely emblematic of the opinions of other jurisdictions that have taken
this approach, and is the most explicit about its application and most thoroughly reasoned.
Therefore, it will often be expressly mentioned in this Note.
20. Erik W. Weibust, Daniel P. Hart, Robyn E. Marsh & Andrew J. Masak, SEYFARTH
SHAW LLP, Lawyer Mobility and Trade Secrets Protection: Restrictive Covenant, Confidentiality,
and Non-Disclosure Considerations in the Legal Profession, at 2 (2014), http://www.
tradesecretslaw.com/files/2014/12/AIPLA-Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/8NUB-CKHW] (“A spike
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has been paid to the New Jersey Opinion’s adverse impact on
businesses and their ability to enter into and enforce reasonable
noncompete agreements against their former in-house counsel.
Moreover, commentators posit that “it seems likely that” New
Jersey’s approach “will be adopted in all jurisdictions that have
21
adopted a version of Rule 5.6.”
This Note contends that the per se prohibition against in-house
noncompetes should be abandoned in favor of the same
reasonableness test that has been applied to restrictive covenants
involving other professions. First, the already-dubious justifications
for the prohibition in the context of outside counsel—ranging from
the special ethical obligations of law firms to the promotion of client
choice in retaining existing legal representation—cannot be logically
extended to in-house counsel. Unlike outside counsel, the in-house
attorney only has one client at a time. As such, the in-house counsel
voluntarily constrains his professional autonomy and effectively
eliminates any concern regarding client choice. Second, as the inhouse counsel provides both legal and business advice, the existing
ethical rules on confidentiality are inadequate to protect a corporate
employer’s legitimate interests. Under Rule 1.9, a former in-house
counsel may disclose and utilize his former corporate employer’s
confidential business information for the benefit of his new,
competing corporate employer, if he obtained such confidential
22
information while performing his nonlegal duties. Ultimately, the
in the number of recent cases [involving misappropriation of trade secrets by in-house counsel]
has brought the issue of restrictive covenants in the legal profession into the limelight.”); see
also Melissa Maleske, Why GCs Should Think Twice Before Signing a Noncompete,
LAW360 (Sept. 16, 2015, 2:22 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/702350/why-gcs-shouldthink-twice-before-signing-a-noncompete [http://perma.cc/8628-DSU3] (providing examples of
misappropriation of confidential information by in-house counsel).
21. Jessica Montello, The Future of Non-Compete Agreements in In-House Practice, ACC
DOCKET, Nov. 2014, at 72, 80.
22. See N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006) (conceding that an “in-house
lawyer could obtain confidential information and/or trade secrets which would not be protected
by Rule 1.6, or the attorney-client privilege,” and that it may be reasonable for a corporation to
ask its lawyers to sign nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements to fill in these gaps in the
ethical rules); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(noting that “general knowledge of the client’s policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude
a subsequent representation”); id. r. 1.6 cmt. 3 (“The confidentiality rule, for example, applies
not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating
to the representation, whatever its source.”); id. r. 1.7 cmt. 6 (“[S]imultaneous representation in
unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as
representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily
constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients.”); id.
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legal profession should not let its steadfast refusal to adopt a
reasonableness test in the law-firm context prevent it from adopting a
reasonable exception for in-house counsel that is fair to corporate
employers.
This Note is segmented into four Parts. Part I provides a
historical overview of the prevailing common-law approach to
enforcing restrictive employment covenants. Part II explores how
restrictive covenants have been applied to the legal profession
generally, and to in-house counsel specifically. Part III provides a
critical analysis of proffered justifications for the per se ban, argues
that the existing ethical obligations are insufficient to protect
corporate interests, and asserts that the New Jersey standard should
be replaced with a standard common-law reasonableness test in the
context of in-house counsel. Part IV proposes that an antitrust lawsuit
is an alternative route that could credibly be utilized to effectuate the
suggested modification of the per se prohibition’s applicability to inhouse counsel in light of the Supreme Court’s recent willingness to
enforce the Sherman Act against state agencies. Specifically, Part IV
asserts that reasonable noncompete agreements have long been
understood to be efficiency enhancing, and therefore an outright ban
on such agreements between corporate employers and in-house
counsel is anticompetitive and a likely violation of the Sherman Act.
I. COMMON-LAW TREATMENT OF NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS
Noncompete agreements present restraint-of-trade issues “that
have been before courts for more than five centuries, and
23
consequently, there is a wealth of authority on the subject.” A
handful of states, including California, Oregon, Texas, Colorado, and
Florida, have enacted specific statutes to regulate noncompete

r. 1.9, cmt. 2 (providing that “a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former
client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of
that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior
client”).
23. Kenneth Engel, Note, Should Minnesota Abandon the Per Se Rule Against Law Firm
Noncompetition Agreements?, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 133, 140 & n.28 (1997) (discussing
Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1952)). In
regard to the range of authority, the Arthur Murray court observed, “[Covenants not to
compete are] not one of those questions on which the legal researcher cannot find enough to
quench his thirst. To the contrary there is so much authority it drowns him. It is a sea—vast and
vacillating, overlapping and bewildering.” Arthur Murray, 105 N.E.2d at 687.

HORVITZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1014

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/2/2016 8:55 PM

[Vol. 65:1007

24

agreements. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, the enforceability
of covenants not to compete is still determined by common-law
25
principles.
A. The Common-Law Reasonableness Test
Early English common law flatly prohibited noncompete
26
restrictions on employees. Thereafter, it “became apparent to the
people and the courts that it was in the interest of trade that certain
27
covenants in restraint of trade should be enforced.” Thus, dating
back to 1711, courts have permitted noncompete agreements ancillary
to an employment relationship, subject to a fact-specific
28
reasonableness test.
The reasonableness of a covenant is assessed with respect to the
time that the contract was made, and the underlying question is a
29
matter of law for the court to decide. Most courts articulate this
30
reasonableness inquiry in the form of a three-pronged test. A
restraint on employment is only reasonable if it (1) is no “greater than
is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer”; (2)
does not “impose an undue hardship on the employee”; and (3) is not
31
“injurious to the public interest.” If the covenant violates any of

24. See generally THOMSON REUTERS, Non-Compete Agreements (Statutes), 0060 SURVEYS
23 (2014) (listing statutes that address the legality and enforceability of noncompete agreements
in U.S. jurisdictions).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing
an overview of each jurisdiction’s approach).
26. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898)
(“Contracts that were in unreasonable restraint of trade at common law were not unlawful in
the sense of being criminal, or giving rise to a civil action for damages in favor of one
prejudicially affected thereby, but were simply void, and were not enforced by the courts.”).
27. Id. at 280.
28. Id. at 279 (citing Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347; 1 P. Wms. 181).
29. Tech. Aid Corp. v. Allen, 591 A.2d 262, 265 (N.H. 1991). Courts assess each
noncompete covenant based on the circumstances of the case. See, e.g., Turner v. Robinson, 107
S.E.2d 648, 650 (Ga. 1959) (evaluating a covenant not to compete based on the particular
circumstances of the case); Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 245 N.E.2d 263, 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (same);
Iowa Glass Depot, Inc. v. Jindrich, 338 N.W.2d 376, 382 (Iowa 1983) (same); Becker v. Bailey,
299 A.2d 835, 838 (Md. 1973) (same); Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Minn.
1965) (same); Greenwich Mills Co. v. Barrie House Coffee Co., 91 A.D.2d 398, 400–01 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1983) (same); Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Berry, 409 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1966)
(same).
30. See, e.g., Tech. Aid Corp., 591 A.2d at 265–66.
31. Id.; see also Merrimack Valley Wood Prods. v. Near, 876 A.2d 757, 762 (N.H. 2005)
(“Nonetheless, restrictive covenants are valid and enforceable if the restraint is reasonable,
given the particular circumstances of the case.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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these prongs, the restriction is unreasonable and therefore
32
unenforceable.
In the context of an employment agreement, it is generally
accepted that an employer has a legitimate interest in restraining the
employee from appropriating trade secrets, confidential information,
and customer relationships to which the employee has had access “in
33
the course of his employment.” An employer generally cannot
restrict a former employee from soliciting new clients or its existing
34
clients with whom the employee had no actual contact.

§ 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that a non-compete agreement “is unreasonably in
restraint of trade” if “the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate
interest, or . . . the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely
injury to the public”).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
33. Id. cmt. b; see also, e.g., Emerson Elec. Co. v. Rogers, 418 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“Under Missouri law, covenants not to compete may be enforced, for ‘an employer has a
proprietary right in his stock of customers and their good will.’” (quoting Mills v. Murray, 472
S.W.2d 6, 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971))); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 324, 324
(D. Minn. 1980) (“Minnesota has [a] significant interest in protecting [its] corporations from loss
of trade secrets and confidential information.”); Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc. v. May Dep’t
Stores Co., 157 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (“A restrictive covenant . . . is only valid
and enforceable if it is necessary to protect trade secrets and customer contacts . . . .”); Easy
Returns Midwest, Inc. v. Schultz, 964 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (“An employer may
only seek to protect . . . its trade secrets and its stock in customers.” (citing Orchard Container
Corp. v. Orchard, 601 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980))). For a sampling of cases enforcing
covenants not to compete to protect trade secrets and confidential information, see Brockley v.
Lozier Corp., 488 N.W.2d 556, 564 (Neb. 1992) (finding an interest in protecting the confidential
information of the employer, but striking down the five-year duration of the covenant);
Whitmyer Bros. v. Doyle, 274 A.2d 577, 583 (N.J. 1971) (“The doubtful nature of the employer’s
claimed trade secrets or confidential information and the comprehensiveness of the verified
denials by the former employees clearly point to the inappropriateness of any preliminary relief
grounded on the suggested legitimate interests of the employer in its trade secrets or
confidential information.”); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 524 A.2d 866, 872 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987) (“[T]here is a legitimate interest of the employer to foster the free exchange of
ideas by its employees without fear that the employees will use trade secrets or confidential
information learned during such interchange to the employer’s disadvantage within a
reasonable time following the termination of employment.”).
34. Many cases heavily emphasize the former employee’s customer contacts or lack
thereof. Compare Wolf & Co. v. Waldron, 366 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (upholding
an injunction that was limited to dealing with former clients), 4408, Inc. v. Losure, 373 N.E.2d
899, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (upholding a restriction), and E. Distrib. Co. v. Flynn, 567 P.2d
1371, 1379 (Kan. 1977) (upholding the modification of a restriction to those countries and those
sales activities in which the employee had been engaged), with Folsom Funeral Serv. v. Rodgers,
372 N.E.2d 532, 533–34 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (refusing to enforce restriction because customer
contacts did not have a great impact on undertaking business), and Brewer v. Tracy, 253 N.W.2d
319, 322 (Neb. 1977) (refusing to enforce an area prohibition that included nine communities in
which employee had not worked).
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Of course, the existence of a legitimate business interest does not
give the employer the unfettered authority to restrain competition.
Rather, to be enforceable the covenant must be reasonable with
respect to “time, territorial effect, [and] the capacity in which the
35
employee is prohibited from competing.”
This common-law reasonableness test was designed to balance
the conflicting interests of employers and employees, as well as the
36
societal interest in open and fair competition. “Employers have a
legitimate interest in preventing unfair competition through the
37
misappropriation of business assets by former employees.” But
38
employees have their own interest in economic mobility. Meanwhile,
35. Beckman v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 598 (Ga. 1982); see also, e.g., Capital
One Fin. Corp. v. Kanas, 871 F. Supp. 2d 520, 538 (E.D. Va. 2012) (enforcing a restrictive
covenant, noting that “[t]he careful language . . . is neither ambiguous nor overbroad. Like its
geographic and temporal limitations . . . the functional scope of the covenant [is] reasonable”);
Iron Mountain Info. Mgmt. v. Viewpointe Archive Servs., LLC, 707 F. Supp. 2d 92, 106 (D.
Mass. 2010) (“The reasonableness of a restrictive covenant is judged by the attendant facts and
circumstances which include whether the business interests to be protected are legitimate, the
temporal and geographic limitations imposed, and so forth.”); Gordon Document Prods. v.
Service Techs., Inc., 708 S.E.2d 48, 52–53 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (finding no error in the grant of
summary judgment against an employer that sought to enforce a noncompete agreement that
was overbroad with respect to its territory and covered activities); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“The extent of the restraint is a critical factor
in determining its reasonableness. The extent may be limited in three ways: by type of activity,
by geographical area, and by time.”); 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 891
(2009) (“When the restraint is for the purpose of protecting customer relationships, [most courts
find that] its duration is reasonable only if it is no longer than necessary for the employer to put
a new person on the job and for the new employee to have a reasonable opportunity to
demonstrate his or her effectiveness to the customer.”). If the restraint is for the purpose of
protecting the employee from disclosing confidential information or trade secrets, a longer
duration tends to be reasonable. 54 AM. JUR. 2D, § 891. Likewise, the reasonableness of the
territory and scope of activity encompassed by the noncompete covenant is entirely dependent
on the circumstances of the particular case:
Among the facts to be considered [in assessing the reasonableness of the area of
restriction] are the area assigned to the employee, the area in which the employee
actually worked, the area in which the employer operated, the nature of the business,
the nature of the employee’s duty, the employee’s knowledge of the employer’s
business operation, and the type of position held by the employee.
Id. § 895 (footnotes admitted).
36. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898)
(explaining the interplay between the competing interests of employers, employees, and the
public).
37. Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete
Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 115
(2008).
38. See id. at 115 (“[E]mployees have a countervailing interest in their own mobility and
marketability.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. c (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) (“In the case of a post-employment restraint, the harm caused to the employee may

HORVITZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

AN UNREASONABLE BAN

2/2/2016 8:55 PM

1017

society has an interest in maintaining clear channels of competition
and fostering a marketplace that properly incentivizes innovation and
39
employment. Given these competing interests, courts permit
employee noncompete agreements, but the reasonableness test
imposes significant safeguards to assure that the agreements benefit
40
the marketplace and do not overly burden employees. A helpful
shorthand is that noncompete agreements are allowed for the
purpose of protecting legitimate business interests and not for the
41
purpose of punishing the departing employee.
B. The Common-Law Reasonableness Test Applied to Nonattorney
Professionals
Outside the legal profession, this reasonableness test governs
covenants not to compete for every business and professional in the
United
States—including
doctors,
ministers,
accountants,
neurosurgeons, veterinarians, engineers, and all other fiduciary-based
42
professionals. In fact, courts often recognize that it is especially
important to uphold reasonable covenants not to compete in

be excessive if the restraint inhibits his personal freedom by preventing him from earning his
livelihood if he quits . . . .”).
39. See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) (“[O]ur
economy is premised on the competition engendered by the uninhibited flow of services, talent
and ideas.”).
40. See, e.g., id. (“[N]o restrictions should fetter an employee’s right to apply to his own
best advantage the skills and knowledge acquired by the overall experience of his previous
employment.”).
41. Healthcare Servs. of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Copeland, 198 S.W.3d 604, 611 (Mo. 2006) (en
banc).
42. Anderson & Steele, supra note 16, at 846; Barton, supra note 6, at 487; see also
Hulsenbusch v. Davidson Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 730, 736 (8th Cir. 1965) (upholding an
engineer’s nationwide covenant not to compete because of knowledge of trade secrets); Schott
v. Beussink, 950 S.W.2d 621, 625–27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding an accountant noncompete
agreement); Concord Orthopaedics Prof’l Ass’n v. Forbes, 702 A.2d 1273, 1276 (N.H. 1997)
(upholding a noncompete agreement that prevented an orthopedist from practicing in a twentyfive-mile radius for two years); Moore v. Dover Veterinary Hosp., Inc., 367 A.2d 1044, 1048
(N.H. 1976) (upholding a restrictive covenant that restricted a veterinarian from practicing in a
twenty-mile radius for five years); Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More, 869 A.2d 884, 887 (N.J. 2005)
(finding that a neurosurgeon restrictive covenant was not per se unreasonable, but concluding
that the broad geographic restriction was injurious to public health and required a narrowing of
scope); Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete Between Physicians:
Protecting Doctors’ Interests at Patients’ Expense, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 14–23 (1992)
(covering cases upholding doctor noncompetes).
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44

professional employment. In Scott v. Gillis, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina explained the rationale for the policy:
Few professional men would take assistants and [e]ntrust them with
their business, impart to them their knowledge and skill, bring them
in contact with their clients and patients, unless they were assured
that the knowledge and skill imparted and the friendships and
associations formed would not be used, when the services were
ended, to appropriate the very business such assistants were
45
employed to maintain and enlarge.

Although courts emphasize their willingness to enforce
noncompete covenants involving professionals, they also assign a
public value to the services these professionals provide. Their concern
for the public welfare produces keen “judicial scrutiny of restraints
on . . . ‘professionals’ because of the actual or perceived value of their
46
services to the community.” The lifeblood of the reasonableness test,
however, is an individualized examination into the factual
circumstances surrounding the specific covenant.
47
Bauer v. Sawyer is a typical noncompete case involving medical
professionals. In Bauer, a noncompete provision within a medicalpartnership agreement obligated the withdrawing doctor to refrain
48
from practice within a twenty-five-mile radius for five years. The
Supreme Court of Illinois recognized that the public had an interest
in ensuring “adequate medical protection,” and acknowledged that, if
the requested enforcement injunction were granted, the number of
49
doctors in the area “of course . . . [would] be reduced.” Since seventy
doctors served the city at issue, the court was “unable to say that the
reduction of this number by one will cause such injury to the public as
43. See, e.g., Lareau v. O’Nan, 355 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. 1962) (“There is no basic public
policy against such covenants, particularly when they invoke professional services. In fact, the
policy of this state is to enforce them unless very serious inequities would result.” (citing
Bradford v. Billington, 299 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Ky. 1957))).
44. Scott v. Gillis, 148 S.E. 315 (N.C. 1929).
45. Id. at 317.
46. Richard A. Lord, 6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 13:6 (4th ed. 2010); see also, e.g.,
Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1282–86 (Ariz. 1999) (considering the public
interest in the context of a physician’s restrictive covenant, likening the physician–patient
relationship to that of a lawyer and client, and, although not banning restrictive covenants
between physicians, ruling that they should be strictly construed for reasonableness and holding
the particular covenant unenforceable).
47. Bauer v. Sawyer, 134 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 1956).
48. Id. at 331.
49. Id.
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50

to justify us in refusing to enforce this contract.” In its enforcement
of the covenant, the court also concluded that, in view of “modern
methods of transportation and communication” as of 1956, the
51
territorial restraint was not unduly burdensome on the doctor.
52
In contrast, in Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza,
the court refused to enforce a covenant that restricted a
gastroenterologist from practicing within a specific twenty-mile radius
53
for three years. If enforced, only one gastroenterologist would
54
practice in a forty-five-mile radius. Presented with extensive
evidence that such shortage would create “critical delays in patient
55
care and treatment,” and could cause potential life-threatening
conditions in emergency situations, the court declined to enforce the
56
covenant in the interest of public welfare.
These are just two examples of countless cases involving nonlegal
57
professionals. They are in no way extraordinary. To the contrary,
they represent typical examples of how restrictive postemployment
covenants have been balanced against the public interest in cases
involving a wide array of professionals (including attorneys until the
1960s) for the last three hundred years—based on the reasonableness
of the restrictive terms in light of the specific factual circumstances.

50. Id.
51. Id.; see also Cogley Clinic v. Martini, 112 N.W.2d 678, 682–83 (Iowa 1962) (enforcing
the covenant in a territory with over sixty other doctors in the community); Foltz v. Struxness,
215 P.2d 133, 137–40 (Kan. 1950) (enforcing territorial restrictions in the covenant as
reasonable); Wilson v. Gamble, 177 So. 363, 366 (Miss. 1937) (“[T]he number of physicians in
Greenville is amply sufficient . . . . [N]o monopoly was either contemplated by the contracts or
will result from their enforcement.”).
52. Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza, 373 S.E.2d 449 (N.C. App. 1988),
aff’d per curiam, 377 S.E.2d 750 (N.C. 1989).
53. Id. at 455.
54. Id. at 453.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 455; see also Dick v. Geist, 693 P.2d 1133, 1136–37 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985)
(invalidating a covenant when presented with extensive evidence that the neonatal unit would
suffer greatly without defendants’ services, even though the community would still have five
pediatricians); Ellis v. McDaniel, 596 P.2d 222, 225 (Nev. 1979) (denying enforcement against an
orthopedic specialist who was the only such physician in his small community).
57. For examples of similar cases, see supra notes 51, 56.
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II. THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S PER SE BAN
Notwithstanding the widespread enforcement of noncompete
agreements against corporate executives, doctors, engineers,
psychiatrists, and all other business employees, lawyers have
collectively refused to submit to the restraints of such agreements.
They have instead asserted that it would be an ethical violation and
sanctionable offense for an attorney to consent to any agreement that
58
limits prospective employment. This blanket prohibition has been
applied consistently to attorneys since a series of advisory ABA
59
Ethics Opinions addressed the issue in the early 1960s. Interestingly,
a historical analysis of the per se ban on attorney noncompete
agreements reveals a dramatic shift in the prohibition’s articulated
60
policy justifications.
Although the noncompete prohibition’s original justification
focused primarily on preserving the professional autonomy of
61
attorneys, the prevailing rationale given by courts today is to provide
existing clients with the freedom to continue to be represented by a
62
departing attorney. Courts typically supplement this justification of
“client choice” by explaining that law-firm employers, unlike
corporations, have an ethical obligation to subordinate profit motives
in favor of client service, so the legal profession does not need to
concern itself with promoting a rule designed to thoroughly protect
63
law-firm economic interests. As discussed below, multiple bar ethics
committees (but no courts) have used these justifications to extend
the prohibition to in-house counsel.
A. The Original Justification for the Prohibition Focused on
Protecting the Attorney’s Right to Practice Law
The initial rationale for implementing a per se ban on attorney
noncompete agreements was based entirely on concerns with the
right of an attorney to practice law, rather than a client’s right to
choose counsel. Specifically, the path toward today’s per se ban began
with the issuance of Formal Opinion 300 by the ABA Committee on
58. Ewald, supra note 10, at 6–7.
59. Id.
60. For an excellent analysis of the shift from professional-autonomy justifications to
client-centric justifications, see id. at 6–12.
61. See infra Part II.A.
62. See infra notes 87–96 and accompanying text.
63. See infra Part III.A.3.
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Professional Ethics in 1961. In ABA Formal Opinion 300, the ABA
Committee was asked to evaluate whether a law firm could “include
as part of the employment contract a restrictive covenant prohibiting
the [attorney] from practicing law in the city and county for two years
65
after the termination of employment.”
The Committee
acknowledged the common use of restrictive covenants in business
transactions, but held that restrictive covenants for attorneys were
unethical because they were an “unwarranted restriction on the right
of a lawyer to choose where he will practice and inconsistent with
66
[their] professional status.” The Committee made no reference at all
67
to maintaining a client’s freedom to choose legal counsel.
This concern over the right of a lawyer to practice, rather than a
client’s freedom to choose counsel, was directly reinforced the next
68
year in ABA Informal Opinion 521. In this ruling, the ABA
addressed whether the analysis in Formal Opinion 300 would also
69
prohibit similar restrictions in a partnership agreement. Focusing
solely on lawyers’ interests instead of clients’, the ABA Committee
postulated that a restrictive covenant in a partnership agreement
70
would be permissible. It explained that in negotiating a partnership
agreement, “the parties are dealing on an equal footing and [the
ABA Committee] believes restrictive covenants within reasonable
and legal limits as between the partners do not involve any questions
71
of ethics.”
In short, the ethical suitability of an attorney covenant not to
compete “was viewed in these early advisory opinions as dependent
upon the relative bargaining power of the lawyers and issues of
fairness among lawyers, rather than upon any articulated potential for
72
harm to the clients.” According to the ABA’s 1962 Informal
Opinion, a restrictive covenant entered into by lawyers with equal
64. See Ewald, supra note 10, at 5 (explaining that the prior lack of concern for
noncompetes in the legal profession “all changed in 1961 when the ABA issued Formal Opinion
300 declaring unethical the use of traditional restrictive covenants—those prohibiting a
departing lawyer from practicing in the community for a stated period”).
65. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961).
66. Id.
67. See id. (failing to reference a client’s freedom to choose legal counsel in opinion).
68. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 521 (1962).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Robert M. Wilcox, Enforcing Lawyer Non-Competition Agreements While Maintaining
the Profession: The Role of Conflict of Interest Principles, 84 MINN. L. REV. 915, 926 (2000).
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bargaining power would be analyzed under the same reasonableness
standard applied to a restrictive covenant in any other profession or
73
occupation.
Six years later, the ABA did a dramatic about-face and explicitly
overruled Informal Opinion 521 with its issuance of Informal Opinion
74
1072. This 1968 Informal Opinion held that the per se prohibition on
attorney noncompetes applied equally to employment agreements
75
and partnership agreements. The ABA Committee asserted,
The right to practice law is a privilege granted by the State, and so
long as a lawyer holds his license to practice, this right cannot and
should not be restricted by such an agreement. The attorneys should
not engage in an attempt to barter in clients, nor should their
practice be restricted. The attorney must remain free to practice
when and where he will and to be available to . . . clients who might
76
desire to engage his services.

Although the Committee’s primary justification for the rule still
appears to have been based on the professional autonomy of the
lawyer, Informal Opinion 1072 provides the first endorsement of
prohibiting attorney noncompete agreements based partially on the
justification that clients have a right to select the attorney of their
77
choice.
In 1969, the ABA adopted this reasoning into its first official
ethics code, the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR
78
2-108. The restriction remained in effect through 1983, at which
point the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct codified the
79
restriction in Rule 5.6(a). The Comments to the Model Rule provide
two specific justifications for prohibiting attorney noncompete
agreements: (1) “limiting [lawyers’] professional autonomy” and (2)
80
“limiting the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer.”

73. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 521 (1962).
74. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 1072 (1968).
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Ewald, supra note 10, at 6–12.
78. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
79. Rule 5.6(a) states, “A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making . . . [an]
agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship,
except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 5.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
80. Id. r. 5.6 cmt. 1.
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B. The Primary Justification Has Shifted to Protecting a Client’s
Right to Choose Counsel
Despite the initial focus on preventing a restriction on an
attorney’s right to practice law, the prevailing and current justification
81
for the prohibition is preserving the client’s right to choose counsel.
82
The seminal case in the field is Dwyer v. Jung, which struck down
the use of a noncompete covenant included in a partnership
83
agreement between lawyers. The contested covenant in Dwyer
“parcel[ed] out named clients to specific partners upon dissolution
and prevent[ed] one partner from intruding upon another’s clients for
84
a period of five years.” The court began its analysis by noting that
“[a] lawyer’s clients are neither chattels nor merchandise, and his
85
practice and good will may not be offered for sale.” The court then
concluded that the contested covenant violated DR 2-108(A), and
was therefore “void as against public policy,” because the covenant
restricted “the right of the lawyer to choose his clients in the event
they seek his services” and “the right of the client to choose the lawyer
86
he wishes to represent him.”
Significantly, the covenant in Dwyer prohibited departing
87
attorneys from representing existing firm clients. This is by no means
uncommon in cases concerning attorney noncompete agreements.
Indeed, a review of the case law reveals that the fundamental
rationale for the per se ban is to permit existing clients to choose to
continue to be represented by a departing attorney, rather than to
provide the public—prospective clients—unfettered access to the
maximum number of attorneys.
88
89
The oft-cited case of Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord helps
illustrates this point. The Cohen court struck down a provision in a

81. Ewald, supra note 10, at 6–12; see also, e.g., Eisenstein v. David G. Conlin, P.C., 827
N.E.2d 686, 690 (Mass. 2005) (“Rule 5.6 exists to protect the strong interests clients have in
being able to choose freely the counsel they determine will best represent their interests.”).
82. Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), aff’d per curiam, 348 A.2d
208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
83. Id. at 501.
84. Id. at 499.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
87. See id. at 499 (noting that the terms of the agreement applied to existing firm clients).
88. Peter W. Rogers, Who Gets the Jewels When a Law Firm Dissolves? The Unfinished
Business Doctrine and Hourly Matters, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 311, 323 (2013) (referring to Cohen
as “one of its decisions that courts in many jurisdictions have cited”).
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partnership agreement that placed a financial disincentive on
competing with the firm, explaining that “[w]hile a law firm has a
legitimate interest in its own survival and economic well-being and in
maintaining its clients, it cannot protect those interests by . . .
restricting the choices of the clients to retain and continue the
90
withdrawing member as counsel.”
Even decisions that are often cited for the lofty proposition that
the per se ban is designed to provide the public with maximum access
to lawyers actually apply that principle only to situations that would
restrict existing clients from continued representation. The decision in
91
Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, for example, emphasizes
“public” access to counsel:
The history behind [RPC 5.6] and its precursors reveals that the
RPC’s underlying purpose is to ensure the freedom of clients to
select counsel of their choice, despite its wording in terms of the
lawyer’s right to practice. The RPC is thus designed to serve the
public interest in maximum access to lawyers and to preclude
92
commercial arrangements that interfere with that goal.

But the Jacob court was confronted with a clause in a
shareholder’s agreement that barred departing attorneys from
collecting termination compensation if they continued to represent
93
existing firm clients within a year of their departure. Thus, the
89. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989).
90. Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
91. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992).
92. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 708 (2006) (citing Jacob, 607 A.2d at 146)
(emphasis added). In response to this passage from Jacob, Professor Linda Sorenson Ewald
usefully observes, “Clearly, the court in Jacob was correct in its assessment of the modern
understanding of the rule’s primary purpose—to protect client choice. But, as the history
suggests, client choice was not the original rationale for the rule and, even today, it is not the
rule’s only purpose.” Ewald, supra note 10, at 11. For this second proposition, Ewald quotes
Donnelly v. Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross, Baskerville, Schoenebaum & Walker, P.L.C., 599
N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1999), for its facetious, yet keenly astute observation:
[W]hile promoting client choice may have been recognized as the primary purpose of
the rule, it is not the Rules’ only purpose. . . . [T]here is no[] doubt that the Rule is
designed to permit attorneys to have retirement plans that have noncompetition
conditions—there is simply no other explanation for the exception to the Rule.
Id. at 11 n.43 (first two alterations in original) (quoting Donnelly, 599 N.W.2d at 681).
93. Jacob, 607 A.2d at 144. When applying Rule 5.6, the vast majority of jurisdictions that
have addressed the issue have agreed with the reasoning of Jacob by concluding that indirect
penalties, as well as direct prohibitions, on postdeparture competition violate the rule. See, e.g.,
Pettingell v. Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, 687 N.E.2d 1237, 1239 (Mass. 1997) (“The strong
majority rule in this country is that a court will not give effect to an agreement that greatly
penalizes a lawyer for competing with a former law firm, at least where the benefits that would
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94

“clients’ free choice of counsel,” which Jacob was concerned about
upholding, could not have been that of prospective clients because
the relevant agreement in no way limited prospective clients’
interests. Rather, Jacob’s main concern, like other decisions invoking
Rule 5.6(a) to strike down a law-firm restrictive covenant, was with
the right of existing clients to have continued access to attorneys of
their choice. In fact, the Jacob decision ultimately explained, “By
forcing lawyers to choose between compensation and continued
service to their clients, financial-disincentive provisions may encourage
lawyers to give up their clients, thereby interfering with the lawyerclient relationship and, more importantly, with clients’ free choice of
95
counsel.” Not surprisingly, every case that is cited in the Jacob
opinion concerns a restrictive covenant that prohibited a departing
partner or associate from representing the firm’s already-established
96
clients.
The legislative history of Rule 5.6 also suggests that a focus on
existing clients was presumably the main motivation for adopting the
special per se standard. Indeed, as explained in the preceding Part,
under the common-law reasonableness test a business already could
not prohibit a former employee from soliciting prospective clients (or
even existing firm clients with whom the employee had no actual
97
contact). Thus, if the legal profession’s concern was for prospective

be forfeited accrued before the lawyer left the firm.”); Whiteside v. Griffis & Griffis, P.C., 902
S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (“Indirect financial disincentives may interfere with this
right just as much as direct covenants not to compete.”). These opinions reason that an
enforceable forfeiture-for-competition clause would tend to discourage an attorney from
withdrawing from a firm, or in the event that the attorney does withdraw, from competing with
the firm. This discouragement, the courts assert, would tend to restrict a client’s choice of
counsel. See, e.g., Pettingell, 687 N.E.2d at 1239 (“An enforceable forfeiture-for-competition
clause would tend to discourage a lawyer who leaves a firm from competing with it. This in turn
would tend to restrict a client or potential client’s choice of counsel.”).
94. Jacob, 607 A.2d at 148.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. See, e.g., Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1262 (Mass. 1989) (reinterpreting a
partnership agreement to bring it into compliance with the Massachusetts’ equivalent of Rule
5.6, and stating that the “strong public interest in allowing clients to retain counsel of their
choice outweighs any professional benefits derived from a restrictive covenant”); Cohen v.
Graham, 722 P.2d 1388, 1391 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (denying enforcement of a partnershipagreement provision prohibiting departing lawyers from representing a firm’s clients); D.C. Bar
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 181 (1987) (determining that a prohibition on a departing partner’s
“interference” with the firm’s clients violates DR 2–108(A)); Tex. State Bar Prof’l Ethics
Comm., Op. 422 (1984) (prohibiting agreements restricting former employees from practicing
law in competition with their former firm, or from representing former clients of the firm).
97. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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clients, it would have little need to adopt a new standard that
effectively duplicated what was already established by hundreds of
years’ worth of common-law precedent.
C. A Small Minority of Courts Have Rejected the Per Se Ban
Notwithstanding general judicial adherence to Rule 5.6, a few
jurisdictions have rejected the Rule as unjustifiably distinguishing the
legal profession from every other profession.
98
In the seminal case of Howard v. Babcock, the California
Supreme Court considered an agreement among law partners that
required a partner to forfeit all withdrawal benefits if the partner
withdrew from the firm and, within one year of the withdrawal,
engaged in the firm’s specialty practice area within the Los Angeles
99
or Orange County court systems. Nevertheless, four partners left the
firm and immediately started a competing practice in the restricted
100
area, drawing over two hundred cases away from the former firm.
The Babcock court concluded that the agreement did not restrict
the right of a partner to practice law, but rather “attache[d] an
economic consequence to a departing partner’s unrestricted choice to
101
pursue a particular kind of practice.” The court explained that law
firms have economic interests to protect just like any other business,
and rejected the contention “that the practice of law is not
102
comparable to a business.” Indeed, the court could “see no legal
justification for treating partners in law firms differently in this
103
respect from partners in other businesses and professions.”
The California Supreme Court carefully considered alternative
arguments before making this precedential assertion. In fact, the
court went on to directly challenge the propriety of Rule 5.6’s
fundamental justifications:
Upon reflection, we have determined that these courts’ steadfast
concern to assure the theoretical freedom of each lawyer to choose
whom to represent and what kind of work to undertake, and the
theoretical freedom of any client to select his or her attorney of
choice is inconsistent with the reality that both freedoms are actually

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993).
Id. at 151.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 157.
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circumscribed. Putting aside lofty assertions about the uniqueness of
the legal profession, the reality is that the attorney, like any other
professional, has no right to enter into employment or partnership in
any particular firm, and sometimes may be discharged or forced out
by his or her partners even if the client wishes otherwise. Nor does
the attorney have the duty to take any client who proffers
employment, and there are many grounds justifying an attorney’s
decision to terminate the attorney-client relationship over the
client’s objection. Further, an attorney may be required to decline a
potential client’s offer of employment despite the client’s desire to
104
employ the attorney.

In 2006, the Arizona Supreme Court in Fearnow v. Ridenour,
105
Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C. followed Babcock’s lead and
enforced an agreement that financially disincentivized competition by
106
attorneys. Like the court in Babcock, the Arizona Supreme Court
found that such agreements should be held to the same
reasonableness standards applied to all other fiduciary-based
107
professionals. In abandoning the majority position, the court ruled it
was “unable to conclude that the interests of a lawyer’s clients are so
superior to those of a doctor’s patients (whose choice of a physician
may literally be a life-or-death decision) as to require a unique rule
108
applicable only to attorneys.”
D. Applicability of the Noncompete Restrictions to In-House Counsel
Although most courts follow the per se ban against noncompete
covenants involving law firms, this author’s research revealed no
instance in which a court has used Rule 5.6 to invalidate a restrictive
covenant between a corporate employer and its in-house-counsel
employee. In fact, in-house counsel, just as their nonlawyer
counterparts, regularly sign such agreements when they begin
109
employment. Nevertheless, several state bar associations have
found these agreements “unethical” under Rule 5.6(a), and

104. Id. at 158–59 (citation omitted).
105. Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C., 138 P.3d 723 (Ariz. 2006) (en
banc).
106. Id. at 724.
107. Id. at 729.
108. Id.
109. See Montello, supra note 21, at 73 (“[P]ast decades have seen a marked increase in the
use of anti-competitive covenants.”).
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commentators believe that other jurisdictions will follow in due
110
course.
There are compelling reasons for treating in-house counsel
differently under Rule 5.6(a), and the early history of the Rule
suggests that it was designed for the law-firm context. DR 2-108(A)
(the predecessor to Rule 5.6), in relevant part, stated, “A lawyer shall
not be a party to or participate in a partnership or employment
agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to
111
practice law after the termination of a relationship.” Because a
corporate employer is not a lawyer, an agreement between in-house
counsel and a corporate employer clearly did not fall within the
technical confines of the original per se ban.
The ABA, in the first opinion to evaluate the applicability of DR
2-108(A) to in-house counsel, confirmed this interpretation of the
text, concluding that an in-house counsel’s covenant not to compete,
112
“does not violate DR [2]-108(A).” In that same opinion, however,
the Committee described such covenants as “undesirable surplusage,”
because the existing ethical canons already protect client confidences,
and further restriction would “denigrate[] the dignity of the
113
profession.” The opinion made no reference to a client’s right to
choose counsel.
In 1983, the ABA replaced the Model Code and DR2-108(A)
with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and an almost114
identical Rule 5.6(a). Nonetheless, the Comments to new Rule 5.6
articulated a new rationale for the prohibition by explaining that
“[the] agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to

110. E.g., id. at 80 (“Based on the current trend cited in Opinion 708, it seems likely that the
same approach will be adopted in all jurisdictions that have adopted a version of Rule 5.6.”).
111. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (emphasis
added).
112. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1301 (1975). In its
original text, the Committee erroneously cited DR2-108(A) as 7-108(A). Id.
113. Id.
114. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2013, at 667
(Art Garwin ed., 2013). The relevant language of Rule 5.6(a) prohibited a lawyer from being a
party to or participating in postemployment restrictions with “a lawyer,” rather than “another
lawyer,” as previously provided in DR 2-108. Id.; see also Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin &
Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 147 (N.J. 1992) (“However, because the wording of DR 2–108(A) and
RPC 5.6 is so similar, the same reasoning is applicable to both.”).
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practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional
115
autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer.”
Although the text of Rule 5.6(a) was extremely similar to the
text of its predecessor rule DR 2-108(A), the ABA’s interpretation of
Rule 5.6(a) soon departed from its prior interpretations of DR 2108(A). In 1994, the ABA held that an employment agreement that
prohibited in-house counsel from ever representing someone against
116
the corporation violated Rule 5.6(a). In reaching its decision, the
Committee stated, “While ethical standards already in place (in
Model Rule 1.9) prohibit a lawyer from undertaking some
representations adverse to former clients, an agreement denying the
lawyer the opportunity to represent any interest adverse to a former
client is an overbroad and impermissible restriction on the right to
117
practice.” The Committee also likened the restriction to one in a
partnership agreement, asserting,
The public would be restricted from access to lawyers who, by virtue
of their background and experience, might be the best available
lawyers to represent them. While a current client’s interests should
assume a certain priority for the lawyer, the extent of those interests
that continue to have a claim on the lawyer after the lawyer-client
relationship is terminated is defined by the scope of the restriction
118
contained in Model Rule 1.9.

Since the 1994 ABA opinion, only seven state bar committees
have specifically addressed the topic of in-house noncompete
agreements. Four of them—the District of Columbia, Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina—followed the ABA’s lead, voiding
the agreements without providing substantive bases for their
119
decisions. In 2006, New Jersey followed suit, extending the ban to
120
in-house counsel in a detailed advisory opinion.

115. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 114, at 668 (emphasis added). The
specific reference to “partners and associates” remained in the Model Rules until 2002. At that
point, it was replaced with “lawyer.” See id. at 667–68.
116. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-381 (1994). The
particular agreement in question did not appear to be specifically designed to protect
confidential information, and it provided no express justification for imposing the restraint.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 291 (1999); Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance
Comm., Op. 96-5 (1996); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 00-11 (2000);
Va. Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1615 (1995). South Carolina’s opinion is emblematic
of this approach—voiding the agreement as violating the “clear provisions of Rule 5.6,” without
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The New Jersey Opinion is now the area’s leading opinion. In
Opinion 708, the New Jersey Supreme Court Advisory Committee on
Professional Ethics considered the propriety of a corporate
employment contract that included a clause prohibiting an attorney
from seeking employment with a competitor for one year after
termination, so as to prevent the disclosure of confidential
122
information and trade secrets. The Committee began its opinion by
citing to Jacob for the proposition that Rule 5.6 is “designed to serve
the public interest in maximum access to lawyers and to preclude
123
commercial arrangements that interfere with that goal.” The
Committee went on to conclude that “[t]he fact that the restrictive
covenant agreement in question arises in the corporate context,
rather than within a law firm, is of no moment,” citing prior decisions
of the ABA, Virginia, Connecticut, Washington, and Pennsylvania as
proof that an “overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the United
124
States” agree.

any further analysis. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 00-11 (2000).
However, the South Carolina Committee also usefully explained,
[F]ully consistent with Rule 1.6 and Rule 5.6, the corporation could insist that a
lawyer employee sign a confidentially [sic] agreement promising to preserve the
corporation’s trade secrets as a condition to employment. . . . Thus, pursuant to the
law of trade secrets, and consistent with the provisions of Rules 1.6, 1.7, and 1.9, in
some circumstances, accepting employment with one employer may preclude certain
other subsequent employment. Rule 5.6 is not so broad as to change that result.
Moreover, the lawyer may enter into an appropriate confidentiality agreement even if it
has some impact on the lawyer's future employment opportunities.
Id. (emphasis added).
120. N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006). By contrast, Connecticut and
Washington have held that such agreements are permissible if they include a “savings clause”
indicating that the covenants are “to be interpreted to comply with any applicable rules of
professional conduct.” Id.; see also Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 02-05
(2002) (agreeing with the New Jersey approach of permitting such agreements when they
include a savings clause); Wash. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 2100
(2005) (same). A savings clause typically clarifies that the Rule’s per se prohibition against
noncompete agreements applies only to legal representation, and not to future employment
with a competitor in a nonlegal capacity. Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op.
02-05 (2002). Thus, the savings-clause approach provides no meaningful insight into whether or
not the agreements are permissible. These opinions essentially say that as long as the covenant
does not violate Rule 5.6, it will not violate Rule 5.6.
121. See Bentrup, supra note 13, at 1039 (discussing how a “majority of jurisdictions” have
taken an approach similar to the New Jersey Opinion).
122. Id. at 1046.
123. Id. at 1041 (quoting Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 146 (N.J.
1992)).
124. N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006).
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Although the Committee struck down the restrictive covenant, it
explained that “general rules concerning confidential information,
[Rule] 1.6, or attorney-client privilege are easy to state, [but] they are
often difficult to apply to in-house counsel, because legal advice given
in the corporate setting ‘is often intimately intertwined with and
125
difficult to distinguish from business advice.’” The Committee went
on to explain that it is particularly important to appreciate this
entanglement of legal and business roles in the context of in-house
counsel because not all duties of an in-house lawyer may involve the
practice of law, and communications “made by and to the in-house
lawyer regarding business matters, management decisions or business
advice are not protected by the attorney-client privilege” or Rule
126
1.6. Thus, the Committee concluded that an “in-house lawyer could
obtain confidential information and/or trade secrets which would not
be protected by Rule 1.6 or the attorney-client privilege,” and
therefore a corporation may reasonably ask its lawyers to “sign a non127
disclosure or confidentiality agreement.”
Opinions issued in Washington and Connecticut similarly
recognized the significance of the hybrid legal/business nature of the
128
in-house position. Connecticut Opinion 02-05 explains that “Rule
5.6 addresses itself only to restrictions affecting the future practice of
law. We therefore would not presume to apply Rule 5.6 in a way that
would limit otherwise permissible restrictions on activities
129
constituting something other than ‘the practice of law.’”
In the ten years since New Jersey Ethics Opinion 708 was issued,
the landscape of ethical rules for in-house counsel has undergone a
130
seismic change. In 2008, the ABA adopted the Model Rule for

125. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 99 (D.N.J.
1990)).
126. Id. (citing Boca Investing P’ship v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 1998)).
127. Id.
128. Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 02-05 (2002); Wash. State Bar
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 2100 (2005).
129. Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 02-05 (2002); see also Wash.
State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 2100 (2005). However, Connecticut and
Washington adopted a “savings clause” approach by approving in-house counsel noncompete
agreements with savings clauses because the agreements purportedly did not limit the attorney’s
professional autonomy or infringe on the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. See supra note
120.
130. See STEPHEN GILLERS, ROY D. SIMON & ANDREW M. PERLMAN, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS, STATUTES AND STANDARDS 408–09 (concise ed. 2014) (providing a legislative
history of Rule 5.5).
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Registration for In-House Counsel, which authorizes in-house
lawyers to provide legal services to their employers without being
fully admitted to the bar of the state where they work, subject to
131
certain conditions. Approximately thirty-four states have already
132
adopted an in-house registration rule in some form. Of those states
that have not adopted the in-house registration rule, many have
adopted new ABA Model Rule 5.5(d)(1) or other rules or policies
133
that allow in-house lawyers to practice without being admitted.
Thus, in-house lawyers are more mobile than they have ever been,
and vastly more mobile than their outside-counsel counterparts. As
more and more lawyers move in house and corporations continue to
insist on protecting their legitimate interests through noncompete
agreements, the need for a uniform and concisely stated standard
regarding the applicability of Rule 5.6 to in-house counsel increases in
importance.
III. NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
AND THEIR CORPORATE EMPLOYERS SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE REASONABLENESS TEST
By extending the ban on restrictive covenants to in-house
counsel, state ethics committees have transformed a questionable
policy of professional self-regulation into an unjustifiable
infringement on the legitimate interests of corporate employers. Over
the last eight years, ethics committees across the country have
introduced a swath of new guidelines that recognize the fundamental
differences between law-firm and in-house-counsel positions, and that
provide in-house counsel with enhanced mobility across
134
jurisdictions. In light of these changes, it is abundantly clear that the
legal profession must abandon its outdated and indefensible per se
ban on restrictive covenants for in-house counsel and replace it with
the standard reasonableness inquiry that is used to evaluate
postemployment agreements in every other profession. First, the
underlying justifications for the per se ban in the law-firm context are
entirely inapplicable to in-house-counsel positions. Second, as the inhouse counsel provides both legal and business advice, the existing
131. Id. at 421.
132. Id. at xxvi.
133. Id.; see also infra notes 166–70 and accompanying text (discussing the amendment of
Rule 5.5 and its adoption by a vast majority of states)
134. See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text.
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ethical rules on confidentiality are inadequate to protect corporate
employers’ legitimate interests. Ultimately, the legal profession
should not let its steadfast refusal to adopt a reasonableness test in
the law-firm context prevent it from adopting a reasonable exception
for in-house counsel that is fair to corporate employers.
A. The Underlying Justifications for the Per Se Ban in the Law-Firm
Context are Inapplicable to In-House Counsel
In its first opinion addressing whether the per se ban applied to
in-house counsel, the ABA straightforwardly conceded that such
agreements were not covered by the applicable ethical rule’s language
135
and, therefore, did not violate its directive. As such, it should not be
surprising that, although the language of the applicable ethical rule
was modified slightly in subsequent versions, the underlying
justifications for the rule remain irreconcilable with the nature of the
in-house position. Specifically, the per se ban’s primary justifications
are that restrictive covenants limit the freedom of clients to choose a
136
lawyer and restrain the professional autonomy of the lawyer. It has
also been noted that the ban on restrictive covenants is permissible
because law firms have an ethical obligation to subordinate profit
137
motives to client service. Because an in-house counsel only serves
one corporate client at a time and has the ability to move among
states to work as a lawyer in jurisdictions where he is not a member of
138
the bar, these justifications simply are not transferable.
1. Limitation On The Freedom Of Clients To Choose a Lawyer.
As Part II details, the prevailing rationale for prohibiting noncompete
provisions in a law-firm partnership or employment agreement is
providing existing clients with the freedom to choose to continue to be
139
represented by an attorney who is departing from the firm. Courts
and commentators in favor of the ban note that, in the law-firm
context, a noncompete agreement can be especially burdensome
because an existing client is denied the opportunity to continue a
140
close fiduciary relationship with a trusted confidant and counsel.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1301 (1975).
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.A.3.
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 87–97 and accompanying text.
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The abandoned client faces the cost of educating a new attorney on
the subject of the representation. And, in extreme situations, the
delay during the transition to a new lawyer could impact the overall
141
resolution of the matter.
This underlying concern for an existing client’s choice of attorney
does not apply to the in-house context. By definition, an in-house
142
attorney only works for one client at a time—his employer. When
an in-house counsel changes his client/employer, it necessarily follows
that he cannot continue to represent his original client/employer—
regardless of a noncompete agreement. Indeed, the only way the
original client/employer could ensure continued representation would
be to preclude the in-house counsel from pursuing any form of
alternative employment (regardless of the nature of the new
company). An employment restriction that sweeping would, of
course, never be countenanced. In short, in cases involving in-house
counsel, “the ability of . . . a client to choose that particular lawyer is
143
limited by the very nature of the employment arrangement.”
The oft-quoted justification for the per se ban as ensuring that
144
attorneys not “barter in clients” is also inapposite in the context of
in-house counsel. In the law-firm setting, a group of attorneys with a
collection of clients might, without the per se ban, attempt to
contractually specify in advance the surviving attorney–client
relationships in the event of a firm dissolution or attorney
145
departure—effectively “bartering” clients. Even if this practice
might be a bona fide concern in a law firm, the in-house counsel has
no client relationship to “barter.” When he departs for another
corporate employer, the in-house counsel has no ability to, or interest
in, continuing to represent his original client.

141. Cf. ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAW FIRM BREAKUPS 29, 68 (1990) (explaining the costs
incurred on clients when they have to change their legal representation).
142. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (explaining
that for an in-house lawyer, the “client” is the company or organization that employs the lawyer
in a legal capacity).
143. Bentrup, supra note 13, at 1058.
144. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Informal Op. 1072 (1968).
145. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 499 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (refusing to
enforce a restrictive covenant “parcel[ing] out named clients to specific partners upon
dissolution”). More often, the noncompete provision would restrict the departing attorney from
working with any firm clients. See, e.g., Cohen v. Graham, 722 P.2d 1388, 1391 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986) (refusing to enforce a partnership provision prohibiting departing lawyers from
representing the firm’s clients).
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Given that the very nature of in-house counsel negates any
concern for an existing client’s choice, the question remains whether
there might be a bona fide concern about infringing on the choice of
prospective clients. A review of the ethical rules clearly shows that no
146
such concern exists.
As the court in Babcock correctly observed, ethical rules do not
147
obligate lawyers to accept every client who wishes to employ them.
In fact, a lawyer may decline to represent a client for any number of
reasons within the lawyer’s discretion, ranging from economic
148
considerations to a desire to limit or alter his practice areas.
Conflict-of-interest rules also often restrict a client’s right to counsel
149
of his choice. Indeed, an attorney may withdraw from representing
a client for nonpayment of fees, even in circumstances in which the
150
withdrawal will have a material adverse effect on the client.
Significantly, the Model Rules actually mandate a covenant not
to compete in the sale of a law practice. Rule 1.17 requires the seller
of a law firm to refrain from the private practice of law in the same
151
geographic vicinity of the firm that he is selling. Thus, Rule 1.17 not
only prohibits the attorney from continuing to represent his existing
clients, it effectively forbids him from working with any prospective
152
clients in the area as well. The harm to existing and prospective
clients is indistinguishable from the harm caused by a similar

146. See Kirstan Penasack, Note, Abandoning the Per Se Rule Against Law Firm Agreements
Anticipating Competition: Comment on Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 889, 911 (1992) (refuting the contention that there is
an absolute right of client choice); see generally Robert W. Hillman, Client Choice, Contractual
Restraints, and the Market for Legal Services, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65 (2007) (providing an
overview of the restrictions on client choice).
147. Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 158 (Cal. 1993).
148. Wilcox, supra note 72, at 936.
149. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESP., AM. BAR. ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 177 (2d ed. 1992) (“Courts have recognized that the ethical
considerations underlying imputed disqualification must be balanced with the right to one’s free
choice of counsel.”).
150. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
151. Id. r. 1.17. Of course, once sold, the clients remain entitled to terminate the relationship
with the purchaser at their discretion. See id. r. 1.17 cmt. 2 (“The fact that a number of the
seller’s clients decide not to be represented by the purchasers but take their matters elsewhere,
therefore, does not result in a violation.”).
152. Ironically, Rule 1.17 is so restrictive on the attorney’s professional autonomy and client
choice that it likely would not be enforceable under the common law. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
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covenant contained in an employment or partnership agreement.
Although the Comments to Rule 1.17 profess the same sentiment
seen in Rule 5.6 opinions that “[c]lients are not commodities that can
be purchased and sold at will,” the Rule 1.17 Comments go on to
explain that it is more important to ensure the purchasing attorney
obtains adequate “compensation for the reasonable value of the
154
practice.” Rule 1.17 not only trounces any notion of an unfettered
right of existing and prospective client choice, it elevates the financial
well-being of a purchasing attorney over the principles of client
choice and professional autonomy. It is incomprehensible why ethics
committees have chosen to flatly forbid a potential client’s choice of
in-house attorney to be bargained away in reasonable noncompete
agreements when a business corporation’s economic well-being is on
the line, but maintain ethical rules that mandate such restrictions
when a purchasing lawyer’s financial well-being is at issue.
Even if the legal community’s professed devotion to “client
choice” were more than just rhetoric, the detriment to the public from
being deprived of a lawyer’s services is no greater than the detriment
that the public sustains from being deprived of other professionals’
services. State ethics committees justify the per se ban by asserting
that “by limiting the mobility of lawyers within any given industry,
clients are left with a smaller and less skilled pool of lawyers from
155
which to choose.” That is undoubtedly true; covenants not to
compete do prevent certain members of the public from accessing a
156
particular attorney’s skills. However, reasonable covenants not to
compete involving other skilled professionals are regularly enforced,
with the court rationalizing that “the reduction of . . . [one doctor] will
[not] cause such injury to the public as to justify . . . refusing to
157
enforce [a covenant not to compete].”
158
This logical lapse has been widely criticized by courts and
commentators in a broad range of professions, arguing that it is

153. John Dwight Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete in the Professions, 3 FLA. ST. U. BUS.
REV. 11, 29 (2003).
154. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.17 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
155. Blackburn v. Sweeney, 637 N.E.2d 1340, 1343 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
156. Of course, noncompete agreements also prevent the public from accessing confidential
information that a particular attorney could misappropriate.
157. Bauer v. Sawyer, 134 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ill. 1956).
158. See, e.g., Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 158 (Cal. 1993) (“Putting aside lofty
assertions about the uniqueness of the legal profession, the reality is that the attorney, like any
other professional, has no right to enter into employment or partnership in any particular firm,
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difficult to find a legitimate argument that doctors and other
fiduciary-based professionals should be treated less favorably than
159
lawyers. Indeed, in a recent New Jersey Supreme Court case
denying the extension of a per se ban to doctors’ covenants not to
compete, the court did not provide a single substantive reason for the
divergent treatment of noncompetes between lawyers and doctors,
and instead opted to “continue to rely on [the] Court’s power to
govern the ethical standards of the legal profession as justification for
160
[its] decision to treat [the two professions] differently.” Any
justification that bar associations might proffer in the law-firm context
would have less force in the realm of in-house attorneys, who provide
service solely to the country’s business corporations, as opposed to
individual citizens.
Ultimately, the in-house counsel’s unique relationship with a
single client/employer, the ethical rules’ overarching lack of concern
for prospective clients, and an unsubstantiated public-policy rationale
for distinguishing lawyers from other professionals are fatal to Rule
5.6’s professed concern for preserving “client choice” as a legitimate
justification for invalidating all noncompete agreements between inhouse counsel and corporate employers.

and sometimes may be . . . forced out by his or her partners even if the client wishes
otherwise.”).
159. See Barton, supra note 6, at 490 (listing commentators from both the legal and medical
profession arguing against this justification); see also Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior
Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“We find no reason to treat attorneys any
differently from professionals such as physicians or certified public accountants . . . .”); Cohen v.
Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 419 (N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, J., dissenting) (“If the agreement
pertained to any other business or profession, there would be no question that the parties would
be held to their bargain.”); HILLMAN, supra note 141, at 29 (“The reasons for distinguishing
lawyering from other professions in this context are vague, and it is questionable whether the
availability of choice for the client is any less critical when the professional engaged is a
physician . . . .”).
160. Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More, 869 A.2d 884, 896 (N.J. 2005). The court appealed to
its authority to regulate the legal profession, and actively pointed out weaknesses in the
decision. The court explained that “both sides mount strong arguments in favor of their
respective positions. We recognize the importance of patient choice in the initial selection and
continuation of the relationship with a physician. We also agree that the similarities between the
attorney–client and physician–patient relationships are substantial.” Id. at 895. Then, as if to
acknowledge that its decision could not be rationally justified, the court went on to list an array
of commentators who have critiqued the policy basis for the different treatment. See id.
(recognizing that “several commentators have criticized the distinction our law makes between
physicians and attorneys in respect of restrictive covenants” and citing three such
commentators).
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2. The Lawyer’s Right to Practice His Profession. As detailed in
Part II.A, the original justification for implementing a per se ban on
attorney noncompete agreements was a belief that such agreements
constituted an “unwarranted restriction on the right of a lawyer to
choose where he will practice and [are] inconsistent with our
161
professional status.”
The root of this protectionist policy may be attributable to an
attorney’s traditional lack of mobility when the per se ban was
162
163
implemented. When Rule 5.6(a) was promulgated by the ABA,
and subsequently adopted by state ethics committees, an attorney
could only practice law in a jurisdiction where she had passed the
164
bar. This rule applied to in-house counsel and outside counsel
165
alike. Thus, if an attorney entered into a covenant not to compete
that restricted her from working in a geographic vicinity, her
prospects for future employment were especially constrained. Unlike
most business executives, the attorney could not simply move to
another state and start practicing law. Therefore, it was logical that
state bar associations would be wary of covenants not to compete that
could place an undue hardship on an attorney’s right to engage in her
profession.
Notably, in 2002, ABA Rule 5.5 was amended, drastically
166
increasing the geographic mobility of in-house counsel. Amended
Rule 5.5(d)(1) reads,
A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not
disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may
provide legal services in this jurisdiction that (1) are provided to the
lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services
167
for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission.

161. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961).
162. See Ewald, supra note 10, at 43 (noting a lack of mobility in the attorney’s practice).
163. The Rule was adopted in 1983. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1983).
164. See id. r. 5.5 (“A lawyer shall not: (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so
violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.”).
165. Id. r. 5.5 cmt 16.
166. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 130, at 408 (providing a legislative history of Model Rule
5.5).
167. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5(d)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (emphasis
added).
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At least forty-four states have now adopted a provision similar or
168
identical to this provision.
In addition to the widespread adoption of Rule 5.5(d)(1), the
ABA House of Delegates in 2008 approved by voice vote a Model
Rule on Registration of In-House Counsel to provide a basis of
169
uniformity in the regulation of in-house lawyers. More than thirty
states have already adopted similar in-house registration rules,
bringing increased standardization to the procedural process
170
governing multijurisdictional in-house practice.
With the recent expansion in multijurisdictional opportunities for
in-house counsel, these attorneys (as compared to outside counsel
working in law firms) now enjoy vastly expanded geographic freedom
to practice wherever they choose. As a result, the special practical
concerns that likely contributed to adoption of the per se ban on
attorney noncompete agreements do not apply in the current in171
house counsel context.
3. The Economic Interests of a Corporation Are Not Subordinate
to a Lawyer’s Interest in Professional Autonomy. Virtually every
discussion of the per se ban explains that “[t]he Rules of Professional
Conduct govern the practice of law based on ethical standards, not
172
commercial desires.” They emphasize that the purpose of the rules
of professional ethics is to guide the conduct of the attorneys and “not
173
to protect the financial interests of law firms.” And they assert that
“[t]he more lenient test used to determine the enforceability of a
restrictive covenant in a commercial setting, is not appropriate in the

168. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 130, at 408 (providing a legislative history of Model Rule
5.5).
169. Id. at 421.
170. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 130, at xxvi. Additionally, in February 2013, the Rule was
significantly amended to permit foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) lawyers to register as in-house counsel,
subject to certain conditions and restrictions. See GILLERS ET AL., supra note 130, at 421
(providing a legislative history of Model Rule 5.5).
171. To continue to prevent a corporation from adequately protecting its rights through
reasonable noncompete agreements based on blind fidelity to a protectionist principle of
professional autonomy that was adopted in a radically different setting would be unreflective of
reality and an abuse of the legal profession’s power to self-regulate. See Linder v. Ins. Claims
Consultants, Inc., 560 S.E.2d 612, 617 (S.C. 2002) (“Our duty to regulate the legal profession is
not for the purpose of creating a monopoly for lawyers, or for their economic protection.”).
172. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 151 (N.J. 1992); Dwyer v. Jung,
336 A.2d 498, 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (“Commercial standards may not be used to
evaluate the reasonableness of lawyer restrictive covenants.”).
173. Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 165 (Cal. 1993).
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174

legal setting.” In short, before even engaging in a balancing of the
conflicting interests of the parties, they assume that “the commercial
concerns of the firm . . . are secondary to the need to preserve client
175
choice.”
From this starting point, the justifications of client choice and
professional autonomy become simple boilerplate. Because courts
have the exclusive authority to “govern the ethical standards of the
legal profession,” they can comfortably define the diminished rights
176
177
of law firms. Law firms are a construct of courts’ ethical rules and,
under that construct, they have already imposed on firms the “ethical
178
obligation to subordinate profit motives in favor of client service.”
Against that background, courts essentially weigh the interests of
client choice against the interests of an entity that is obligated to put a
client’s right over its own. With the scales tipped so heavily, the
inevitable product is the per se ban and the conclusion that the
“protection of the clients’ ability to employ the attorneys they have
come to trust, is more important than safeguarding the economic
179
interests of established attorneys and law firms.”
Unlike law firms, corporations are not constructs of legal-ethics
rules. Ethics committees, like that of New Jersey, fail to acknowledge
this difference between law firms and corporate employers when they
apply the same reasoning to restrictive covenants in both employment
contexts and directly dismiss the distinction as being “of no
180
moment.” Corporations are not comprised solely of “established
181
attorneys.” They have no “ethical obligation to subordinate profit
182
motives in favor of client service.” To the contrary, their duty is to
183
maximize value for shareholders.
As such, an ethics committee cannot lightly relegate the
corporation’s interests below the interests of the departing attorney.
174. Jacob, 607 A.2d at 151 (citations omitted).
175. Id.
176. See supra note 159–160 and accompanying text.
177. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“‘[L]aw firm’
denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law firm partnership . . . .”).
178. Herbert, supra note 14, at 269 n.162 (stating the applicable North Carolina statute).
179. Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 161 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
180. N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006).
181. Id.
182. Cf. Herbert, supra note 14, at 269 n.162 (discussing an applicable North Carolina
statute, which provides that lawyers do indeed have the obligation to subordinate profit motives
in favor of client service).
183. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 681 (Mich. 1919).
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It is uniformly recognized that corporations have a significant interest
184
in protecting their trade secrets and confidential information, and
185
they regularly use restrictive covenants to protect these interests.
Simply because they hire an attorney does not mean they no longer
have legitimate business interests worth protecting.
In the law-firm context, it is conceivable to defend the legitimacy
of the per se ban with the baseline rationale that “the commercial
concerns of the firm . . . are secondary to the need to preserve client
186
choice.” However, one cannot replace the word “firm” with
“corporation,” and assert that this same principle holds true.
Interestingly, it appears that no court decisions fall prey to this logical
fallacy. Yet, that is precisely what ethics committees have done by
expressly extending the per se prohibition on attorney noncompetes
to encompass in-house counsel.
B. The Existing Ethical Obligations of an Attorney Do Not
Adequately Protect the Legitimate Interests of the Corporation
Perhaps based upon a recognition that the preexisting
justifications for the per se ban are inapplicable to the in-house role,
ethics committees have largely justified the extension of the per se
ban to in-house attorneys by asserting that an attorney’s preexisting
ethical obligations of confidentiality under Rule 1.9 adequately
187
protect corporate employers.
184. See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 324, 334–35 (D. Minn. 1980)
(finding that Minnesota has significant interest in protecting its corporations from loss of trade
secrets and confidential information); Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993) (upholding restrictive covenant to protect employer’s commercial interests
against employee’s disclosure of confidential information and trade secrets); Victoria’s Secret
Stores, Inc., v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 157 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a
protectable interest in trade secrets and confidential information); Superior Gearbox Co. v.
Edwards, 869 S.W.3d 239, 247–48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“An employer has protectable interests
in . . . trade secrets.”).
185. Significantly, although these corporations can require in-house counsel to execute
confidentiality agreements and other protections, it is much easier for the corporation to protect
itself, as a practical matter, by ensuring that a trusted employee does not depart for a direct
competitor. That is, of course, precisely why corporations routinely include noncompete
covenants in their employment agreements.
186. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 151 (N.J. 1992).
187. In the first opinion addressing the propriety of covenants not to compete in the inhouse counsel setting, the ABA Ethics Committee made no reference to principles of client
choice, professional autonomy, or the legitimate interests of the employer, and conceded that
such agreements were not covered by the language of the applicable ethical rule, and therefore
did not violate its directive. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1301
(1975). Yet, despite the text of the rule and its justifications mandating a contrary conclusion,
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However, Rule 1.9 clearly does not provide adequate protection
from misappropriation of confidential information. Rule 1.9(a) states,
“A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which [the] person’s interests are materially adverse
188
to the interest of the former client.” This concept is seemingly
reinforced by one of the Rule’s Comments: “When a lawyer has been
directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation
of other clients with materially adverse interests is clearly
189
prohibited.” The Comment’s “next sentence tends to muddy the
190
water a bit” : “On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled
a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later
representing another client in a wholly distinct problem of that type
even though the subsequent representation involves a position
191
adverse to the prior client.” Thus, in most cases, the text of Rule 1.9
does not provide clear guidance for disqualification.
One abundantly clear aspect of Rule 1.9 is that under its
directive, an attorney’s duty “to retain confidentiality extends only to
192
information ‘relating to [legal] representation of a client.’”
“Further, communications made by and to the same in-house lawyer
regarding business matters, management decisions or business advice
193
are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.” This principle is

the Ethics Committee noted its disapproval. Although the Committee let the agreement stand,
it explained that “[t]he Code of Professional Responsibility specifically requires that a lawyer
shall preserve and protect confidences and secrets of one who has employed him,” and
therefore the covenant is “undesirable surplusage” that “denigrates the dignity of the
profession.” Id.; see also, e.g., N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 708 (2008) (noting that
many jurisdictions “have found that non-compete agreements designed to protect against the
disclosure of a corporation’s confidential information and trade secrets are superfluous, due to a
lawyer’s overriding obligation to maintain client confidentiality”). In its next opinion on the
subject, the ABA Committee did not claim that the duties to a former client under Rule 1.9
protected all of a corporation’s confidences, or that a covenant would be “surplusage”; it merely
asserted that any restriction beyond those codified in Rule 1.9 “would impermissibly restrain a
lawyer from engaging in his profession.” ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 94-381 (1994). This reasoning has generally been adopted by state ethics
committees extending the per se ban to in-house counsel. See, e.g., N.J. Advisory Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics, Op. 708 (2008) (adopting this stance and listing other jurisdictions that had as
well).
188. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
189. Id. cmt. 2.
190. Hyman Cos. v. Brozost, 964 F. Supp. 168, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
191. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
192. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 708 (2008).
193. Id.
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important in the context of in-house counsel because legal advice
given in the corporate setting “is often intimately intertwined with
194
and difficult to distinguish from business advice.” In fact, the New
Jersey Ethics Committee that extended the ban even conceded that
“[n]ot all duties of an in-house lawyer may involve the practice of
195
law,” and therefore an “in-house lawyer could obtain confidential
information and/or trade secrets which would not be protected by
196
[Rule] 1.6, [1.9] or the attorney-client privilege.” This concession is
fatal to the argument that all in-house-counsel restrictive covenants
should be barred because the ethical rules provide ample protection
for corporate confidences. To the contrary, everything that the
attorney learns during the distinctly “business” portion of his job will
not be subject to confidentiality restrictions under the ethical rules.
In light of this void in protection, both the New Jersey and South
Carolina Committees explained that a corporation may ask its
197
lawyers to “sign a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement.”
Specifically, the South Carolina Committee explained that “[f]ully
consistent with [confidentiality rules] and Rule 5.6, the corporation
could insist that a lawyer employee sign a confidentiality agreement
promising to preserve the corporation’s trade secrets as a condition to
198
employment.” Based upon Rules 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, and trade-secret laws,
the Committee found that “in some circumstances, accepting
employment with one employer may preclude certain other
subsequent employment. Rule 5.6 is not so broad as to change that
result. Moreover, the lawyer may enter into an appropriate
confidentiality agreement even if it has some impact on the lawyer’s
199
future employment opportunities.”
By acknowledging that corporations can use confidentiality
agreements for in-house counsel, ethics committees again are
implicitly conceding that the existing ethical rules do not adequately
protect against the threat of disclosing confidential business
information. However, confidentiality agreements are incapable of
providing sufficient protection. For all other professions, courts and
scholars recognize that employers may enforce covenants not to

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 00-11 (2000).
Id.
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compete in addition to confidentiality agreements because the
covenant not to compete fills the voids in the confidentiality
agreement and provides an enhancement necessary to protect
200
employer rights.
Given the fact that certain aspects of the lawyer’s job as an inhouse counsel are not “legal” or governed by applicable ethics rules,
lawyers should not be treated any differently from their fellow
employees whose covenants are assessed under the common-law
reasonableness test. To the extent that a particular court, based on
the unique facts of a case, finds that the attorney’s ethical duties
adequately protect the employer’s rights, the court could circumscribe
the covenant accordingly under the analytically flexible
reasonableness test.
IV. BAR ASSOCIATIONS THAT PERPETUATE THE PER SE BAN
COULD FACE ANTITRUST LIABILITY
When a group of competing professionals agrees to do something
that benefits itself at the expense of consumers, the collective actors
201
typically would be held liable under the Sherman Act
for
anticompetitive behavior. As demonstrated in Parts I–III of this Note,
the extension of the per se ban on restrictive covenants to in-house
counsel has left corporations exposed to potential misappropriation
of confidential information and trade secrets, so that attorneys can
202
protect their “right to choose where [t]he[y] will practice.” This is
203
precisely the type of “self-serving” behavior that antitrust laws
condemn.
State bar associations, however, historically have operated
largely outside of antitrust jurisdiction based on an assumption that
204
they were protected by the state-action immunity doctrine. Yet, in
200. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Restatement’s Supersized Duty of Loyalty Provision, 16
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 395, 395–96 (2012) (describing the growth of the “twin doctrines” of
noncompetes and trade secret protections); Derek P. Martin, Comment, An Employer’s Guide
to Protecting Trade Secrets from Employee Misappropriation, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 949, 960
(asserting that noncompetes “strengthen[] the employer’s case” when trying to protect
confidential information).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
202. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961).
203. See Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass’n, 449 N.E.2d 276, 280–81 (Ind. 1983) (rejecting
doctors’ arguments to extend the per se prohibition on noncompete clauses to their profession,
instead reasoning that “[t]he [doctors’] self-serving position . . . cannot be upheld”).
204. See Gary A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm
Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 587–88 (1992) (arguing that an ethical rule adopted
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its recent landmark decision—North Carolina State Board of Dental
205
Examiners v. FTC —the Supreme Court clarified that state agencies
controlled by active market participants (like many state bar
associations) must be under “active supervision” by the state to enjoy
206
federal antitrust immunity. In the recent months since the Dental
Board decision, the legal blogosphere has exploded with dozens of
articles explaining that the Court’s decision likely exposes state bar
associations to antitrust liability for their protectionist and
207
anticompetitive actions. Further, corporations and individuals who
have been disadvantaged by state bar associations’ anticompetitive
policies, such as LegalZoom, have started to file antitrust lawsuits
208
against these associations.
This Part proceeds in two Sections. Section A demonstrates how
the extension of the per se ban on noncompetes to in-house counsel is
anticompetitive and violates the Sherman Act absent state-action
immunity. Section B argues that these state bar associations are not
immune from antitrust liability under the Supreme Court’s Dental
Board standard.

by a state bar association could be challenged on anticompetitive grounds, but that the Federal
Trade Commission has declined to pursue these actions).
205. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
206. Id. at 1112.
207. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Could Dental-Board Decision Unlock Lawyer Control of State
Bar Regulations?, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2015, 7:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2015/03/04/dental-board-decision-could-unlock-lawyer-control
[http://perma.cc/
S58L-WMKC] (“While the case dealt specifically with dentistry . . . the ruling will have far
broader ramifications for many professions, including how the practice of law is regulated.”);
Mark Walsh, Dental Board Ruling May Drill into State Bar Associations’ Immunity, ABA
JOURNAL (May 1, 2015, 6:55 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/dental_
board_ruling_may_drill_into_state_bar_associations_immunity
[http://perma.cc/Q64V-5FNT]
(“The ruling could expose state bar associations and oversight boards to greater antitrust
liability . . . .”).
208. See, e.g., Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 5, LegalZoom.com, Inc. v.
N.C. State Bar, No. 1:15-CV-439 (M.D.N.C. June 3, 2015), 2015 WL 3499887, at ¶ 5 (claiming
that the State Bar “illegally and unreasonably restrain[ed] trade in the market for legal
services”). Some plaintiffs in these suits have already settled claims favorably. See, e.g., Terry
Carter, LegalZoom Resolves $10.5M Antitrust Suit Against North Carolina State Bar, ABA
JOURNAL (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_
resolves_10.5m_antitrust_suit_against_north_carolina_state_bar
[http://perma.cc/QW9V-A8
GQ] (explaining that under its agreement with North Carolina LegalZoom will be allowed to
continue operating in the state).
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A. The Extension of the Per Se Ban on Noncompetes to In-House
Counsel Violates the Sherman Act Absent State-Action Immunity
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits “[e]very
209
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” To
establish a Section 1 antitrust violation, a plaintiff must prove “(1) a
contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) that imposed an
210
unreasonable restraint of trade.” For professional associations
engaged in self-regulation, such as bar associations, an association’s
adoption of ethical rules or opinions constitutes evidence of a
concerted action or agreement sufficient to trigger application of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and therefore meets the first
211
prerequisite for its violation. Thus, the question often turns to
whether the association’s action unreasonably restrains competition.
Under the antitrust rule of reason, “[t]he true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
212
or even destroy competition.” Although many ethical restraints are
adopted ostensibly to protect or improve “quality of care,” the
Supreme Court has made clear in at least four decisions that there is
no blanket quality-of-care defense to otherwise proscribed restraints
213
implemented by professionals. In assessing the New Jersey Bar
Association’s ruling in Opinion 708 and ones like it, a full “rule-ofreason” analysis is required that “consider[s] the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; [and] the nature of the restraint and

209. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
210. Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 202 (4th Cir. 2002)).
211. E.g., N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 356 (5th Cir. 2008) (“When an
organization is controlled by a group of competitors, it is considered to be a conspiracy of its
members.”); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 728 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that
“[p]rofessional associations are ‘routinely treated as continuing conspiracies of their members’”
(quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988))); Kreuzer
v. Am. Acad. of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that there was
“no doubt that a conspiracy existed within” a professional association that enforced rules
regarding requirements for “active membership” in the association); In re Cal. Dental Ass’n,
121 F.T.C. 190, 292 (1996) (“[P]rofessional associations are routinely treated as continuing
conspiracies of their members.”).
212. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
213. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 464 (1986); Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 31
(1984); Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 699 (1978).
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214

its effect, actual or probable.” In short, under the antitrust rule of
reason, courts evaluate whether the procompetitive effects of the
action outweigh the anticompetitive effects. As demonstrated below,
a state ethics committee’s collective ban on reasonable covenants not
to compete in the context of in-house counsel is inherently
anticompetitive.
1. Reasonable Noncompete Agreements are Actually
Procompetitive. The plain language of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
215
prohibits “every” contract that restrains trade. Because such a
literal reading of the statute “would outlaw the entire body of private
216
contract law,” and because Congress “expected the courts to give
shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law
217
tradition,” courts have “long held that certain ‘ancillary’ restraints
218
of trade may be defended as reasonable.”
Specifically, under antitrust analysis “covenants not to compete
in a particular business, for a certain period of time, within a defined
geographical area, ha[ve] always been considered reasonable when
219
necessary to carry out otherwise procompetitive contracts.” Courts
consistently explain that they uphold such covenants because it is
“necessary for people to cooperate in some respects before they
220
compete in others, and cooperation facilitates efficient production.”
In short, although perhaps semantically counterintuitive, reasonable
noncompetes effectuate a procompetitive result in the marketplace.

214. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238.
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, “Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” Id.
216. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
531 (1983) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 687–88).
217. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 687–88.
218. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 737 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
219. Id.
220. Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Antitrust law is
designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and competition, not to require all
economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment.”); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (noting that in some industries, “horizontal restraints on
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all”); Major League Baseball Props.,
Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 338 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting the “efficiency-enhancing” purpose
of reasonable restrictive covenants); Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133,
1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 970 (10th Cir. 1994)
(same).
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A commonplace demonstration of the hiring process illustrates
the procompetitive effect of restrictive covenants: A hires B as a
salesman. B signs a reciprocal covenant not to compete, and A then
passes valuable customer lists to B. “At the time A and B strike their
bargain, the enterprise (viewed as a whole) expands output and
competition by putting B to work. The covenant not to compete
means that A may trust B with broader responsibilities, the better to
221
compete against third parties.”
This procompetitive aspect of noncompete covenants is of
paramount importance. It is undoubtedly true that once employment
ends, nothing is left but the restraint—“but the aftermath is the wrong
222
focus.” As Judge Frank Easterbrook has explained, “A legal rule
that enforces covenants not to compete, even after an employee has
launched his own firm, makes it easier for people to cooperate
223
productively in the first place.” Under such a regime, an employer,
“[k]nowing that he is not cutting his throat by doing so . . . will train
the employee, giving him skills, knowledge, and trade secrets that
224
make the firm more productive.”
2. The Bar Associations’ Per Se Ban on Reasonable Noncompetes
Is Inherently Unreasonable. Prior to the 1960s, restrictive covenants
for attorneys, like all other professionals, were governed on a case225
specific basis under the common-law reasonableness test. The
antitrust
“rule-of-reason”
test
mirrors
the
common-law
226
reasonableness test discussed above. It follows, therefore, that the
221. Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189 (emphasis added).
222. Id.
223. Id. (emphasis added).
224. Id. To be clear, the procompetitive aspects of covenants not to compete not only
benefit the employer and the employee but also benefit the public at large. Judge (later Chief
Justice and President) Taft, in the premier antitrust case in U.S. history, explained that
“[c]ontracts for the partial restraint of trade are upheld, not because they are advantageous to
the individual with whom the contract is made . . . but because it is for the benefit of the public
at large that they should be enforced.” United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,
281 (6th Cir. 1898) (quoting Mallan v. May, 11 Mees. & W. 652, 665–66 (1843)). Judge Taft
agreed with the reasoning of an earlier decision, which stated that “the public derives an
advantage in the unrestrained choice which such a stipulation gives to the employer of able
assistants, and the security it affords that the master will not withhold from the servant
instruction and experience.” Id. (emphasis added).
225. See supra Part I.
226. See, e.g., Baker’s Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 730 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) (finding that a reasonable covenant does not violate the Sherman Act); Carvel Corp. v.
Eisenberg, 692 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining that covenants should be analyzed
for antitrust purposes under the rule of reason); R.W. Intern., Inc. v. Borden Interamerica, Inc.,
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per se ban on attorney noncompete agreements raises a serious
antitrust issue. The per se ban, after all, precludes even reasonable
attorney noncompete agreements, which are enforced only if they are
227
procompetitive, efficiency enhancing, and in the public interest. By
establishing a per se ban, the bar committees have effectively
eliminated a legal regime that allows people “to cooperate [more]
228
productively in the first place,”
and to form contracts that
229
“benefit . . . the public at large.”
As Parts I–III explain, public-interest justifications do not
warrant prohibiting all noncompete agreements involving in-house
230
counsel. The per se prohibition is particularly egregious in light of
the fact that the common-law reasonableness test provides the
analytical flexibility to strike down a specific covenant at a more
informed stage on the basis of public interest. And where other
professionals (like doctors) have advocated for a per se ban against
covenants not to compete on the basis of “public interest,” courts
have consistently rejected these requests—calling a per se rule “selfserving” and recognizing the harm that could result to patients under
231
such an approach. Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has dismissed
these self-serving “quality-of-care” arguments, making clear that
professional associations have no excuse to masquerade
232
anticompetitive policies as ethical rules.

673 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D.P.R. 1987) (noting that covenants not to compete are analyzed under
the rule of reason); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Corp., 500 F. Supp. 332, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(holding that a covenant not to compete was not an antitrust violation under the rule of reason);
Vanguard Envtl., Inc. v. Curler, 190 P.3d 1158, 1169 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007) (holding that a tenyear restrictive covenant unlimited by geography was an unreasonable restraint of trade).
227. See supra note 220 (collecting cases); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 188 (1981) (considering injury to the public as part of the analysis for the rule of
reason).
228. Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985).
229. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 281.
230. The analysis in Part I, in particular, bolsters this by demonstrating that Rule 5.6’s policy
justifications do not apply to in-house counsel.
231. Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass’n, 449 N.E.2d 276, 280–81 (Ind. 1983); see also
Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 866 N.E.2d 85, 95 (Ill. 2006) (“[R]estrictive covenants
can have a positive impact on patient care. We do not know, and are ill-equipped to determine,
what the possible consequences might be if we were to adopt the sweeping changes plaintiffs
advocate.”); id. (“It is possible that patients would be more adversely affected if we were to ban
reasonable restrictive covenants in physician employment contracts.”); Cent. Ind. Podiatry, P.C.
v. Krueger, 882 N.E.2d 723, 728 (Ind. 2008) (“Any decision to ban physician noncompetition
agreements altogether should be left to the legislature.”).
232. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 464 (1986); Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 31
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By prohibiting reasonable covenants not to compete in order to
233
protect the “professional autonomy” of lawyers, bar associations
have placed the parochial, self-interested concerns of bar members
over a balanced legal regime designed to protect competition and
consumers. Such behavior is manifestly anticompetitive and likely in
violation of the Sherman Act.
B. Bar Associations Are Not Entitled to State-Action Immunity
Under the Supreme Court’s Dental Board Standard
The primary reason that ethics opinions, like New Jersey
Opinion 708, have not been challenged under antitrust doctrine is
that, for the last several decades, courts have assumed that challenges
to state bar associations would fail under the state-action immunity
234
doctrine. The core doctrine of state-action immunity holds that a
235
“state’s own actions ‘ipso facto are exempt’ from the antitrust laws.”
In other words, the state has the power to restrict trade, grant
monopolies, and authorize business combinations that otherwise
would be illegal under federal law. For example, legal ethics rules are
immune from antitrust liability because they are promulgated by the
state supreme court (not the bar association) and, therefore, are an
236
exercise of the state’s sovereign power. However, legal ethics
opinions adopted by state bar associations, rather than courts, are not
subject to the same blanket immunity. In fact, the Supreme Court
specifically rejected this contention in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
237
Bar, in which it held a state bar association liable under Section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act: “[T]hat the State Bar is a state agency for

(1984); Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 699 (1978); see also Am. Med.
Ass’n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (“[T]he fact that the conspiracy may
be intended to promote the public welfare . . . is [not] sufficient to avoid the penalties of the
Sherman Act.”).
233. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
234. See Munneke, supra note 204, at 587–88 (discussing the FTC’s reluctance to pursue
antitrust actions against ethics opinions of state bar associations).
235. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis
added).
236. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977) (“[When] the challenged
restraint is the affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court . . . the ultimate body
wielding the State’s power over the practice of law . . . restraint is ‘compelled by direction of the
State acting as a sovereign.’” (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 41 U.S. 773, 791 (1975))).
237. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 41 U.S. 773 (1975).
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some limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows
238
it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.”
Although that decision in its own right would suggest that all
behavior of bar associations would be susceptible to antitrust attack,
subsequent case law has not provided a consistent or clear framework
to determine when bar associations (or other similar state agencies)
239
are susceptible to antitrust liability.
Supreme Court precedent holds that a “private actor” can be
immune from the antitrust laws under the state-action-immunity
doctrine only if the challenged restraint is (1) “clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy” and (2) “actively supervised”
240
by the state itself. It was generally accepted that a state bar’s action
would, at a minimum, need to be “clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy” to be immune under the state241
action doctrine. Prior to the Dental Board case, however, it was also
almost unanimously believed that bar associations would not have to
242
meet the “active state supervision” prong to secure immunity. As
such, state ethics committees, operated by market participants who
are elected by other market participants, regularly issue ethics
opinions and conclude, without judicial oversight, that in-house
243
attorneys may not sign covenants not to compete.
Dental Board explicitly rejected this assumption and held that “a
state board on which a controlling number of decisionmakers are
active market participants in the occupation the board regulates must
satisfy Midcal’s active supervision requirement in order to invoke

238. Id. at 791.
239. Munneke, supra note 204, at 594.
240. Id. at 593 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978)).
241. Id.
242. Supreme Court: State Agencies Controlled by Active Market Participants Must Have
Active State Supervision to Qualify for Antitrust Immunity, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Mar.
2, 2015), http://www.mwe.com/Supreme-Court-State-Agencies-Controlled-by-Active-MarketParticipants-Must-Have-Active-State-Supervision-to-Qualify-for-Antitrust-Immunity-03-022015 [http://perma.cc/X8F9-E9MH]; see also Munneke, supra note 204, at 594 (“[T]he state may
avoid such a conflict by either formulating standards and administering procedures or
delegating the job to private parties, in which case the policies displacing competition must be
clearly and affirmatively expressed and appropriately supervised.”).
243. See id. at 594 n.219 (“Although procedures vary from state to state, state supreme
courts, in practice, are seldom active participants in overseeing anticompetitive policy. Rather,
they oversee the disciplinary process as a whole.”).
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244

state-action antitrust immunity.” The Court sensibly explained that
“[w]hen a State empowers a group of active market participants to
decide who can participate in its market, and on what terms, the need
245
for supervision is manifest.” As such, “[t]he similarities between
agencies controlled by active market participants and private trade
associations are not eliminated simply because the former are given a
246
formal designation by the State.”
In the future, state bar associations can adjust their
organizational structures and their relationships with the state
supreme courts to help ensure that they meet this new criteria for
active state supervision. However, many state bar associations have
almost certainly lacked adequate supervision. In amici filings in
Dental Board, the state bar associations themselves acknowledged
that “[m]any state legislatures have chosen to regulate the legal
profession through agencies composed of lawyers elected by their
peers” (the precise definition of a private market participant under
the Fourth Circuit’s test), and conceded that “[i]f the Fourth Circuit’s
247
decision stands, those state bars will face Sherman Act liability.”
Given the clearly anticompetitive effect of the extension of the
per se ban to in-house attorneys, and the absence of active state
supervision, state ethics commissions are vulnerable to antitrust
lawsuits.
CONCLUSION
The existing per se ban on noncompete agreements in the legal
profession is hard to reconcile with the successful application of the
common-law reasonableness test for every other profession. In fact,
no logical basis exists for imposing a flat prohibition on noncompete
agreements in the legal context, rather than balancing the competing
interests of employer, employee, and the public at large on a casespecific basis.

244. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015) (referring to Cal.
Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980)).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Brief of the North Carolina State Bar et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
6, 17, N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13-154) (essentially
conceding that state bar associations do not proceed under “active supervision” of the state
itself).
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However problematic the per se ban might be when applied to
attorneys departing law firms, it is far more troubling when applied to
in-house counsel. Indeed, the arguments typically advanced in the
context of outside counsel—ranging from the special ethical
obligations of law firms to the promotion of client choice in retaining
existing legal representation—are inapposite to in-house counsel. By
rubberstamping an already dubious per se ban in a context in which it
has no plausible justification, courts and bar ethics committees harm
employers and the public. The per se ban on reasonable noncompete
agreements involving in-house counsel is anticompetitive, and bar
ethics committees that continue to espouse that ban may risk antitrust
liability.

